Uninformative Equilibrium in Uniform Price Auctions

I analyze the incentive for costly information collection in a multi-unit commonvalue uniform-price auction in which bidders submit demand functions. I show that so long as there are some bidders who have a very high cost of information collection, even if there are a large number of other bidders who face an arbitrarily small cost of information collection, there are equilibria in which no bidder collects information.

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Year of publication:	2007-01
Authors:	Daripa, Arup
Institutions:	Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics
Subject:	Costly information acquisition \| uniform price auction \| uninformed bidders \| uninformative equilibrium

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 0701
Classification:	D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005811543