Union Strategy and Optimal Income Taxation

Restrictions on work hours are more important in countries with a large welfare state. We show that this empirical observation is consistent with the strategic effects of such restrictions in a welfare state in the context of optimal direct taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). Our results also apply to non-welfarist states which have income redistribution, but not in purely extortionary states.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Kessing, Sebastian G. ; Konrad, Kai A.
Publisher:	Bonn : Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Subject:	Einkommensteuer \| Optimale Besteuerung \| Arbeitszeitflexibilisierung \| Gewerkschaftspolitik \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Einkommensumverteilung \| Wohlfahrtseffekt \| Theorie \| optimal income taxation \| labor unions \| work hours

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Series:	IZA Discussion Papers ; 1545
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	483527114 [GVK] hdl:10419/21321 [Handle]
Classification:	H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262651