Unions' Relative Concerns and Strikes in Wage Bargaining

We consider a model of wage determination with private information in an oligopoly. We investigate the effects of unions having relative concerns on the negotiated wage and the strike activity. We show that an increase of unions’ relative concerns has an ambiguous effect on the strike activity

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Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Mauleon, A. ; Vannetelbosch, Vincent ; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. ; Vergari, Cecilia
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Tarifverhandlungen \| Collective bargaining \| Gewerkschaftstheorie \| Trade union theory \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes \| Collective bargaining theory \| Duopol \| Duopoly \| Arbeitskampf \| Industrial action

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (10 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Bulletin of Economic Research, Vol. 66, Issue 4, pp. 374-383, 2014 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 2014 erstellt
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D60 - Welfare Economics. General ; J50 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014141753