Unique Implementation in Auctions and in Public Goods Problems.

We present new conditions that guarantee the existence of mechanism with a unique or essentially unique equilibrium in auction and public goods problems with quasi-linear utility functions. These conditions bear only on the information structures of the agents.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	d'Aspremont, C ; Cremer, J ; Gerard-Varet, L-A
Institutions:	Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM), Aix-Marseille School of Economics (AMSE)
Subject:	AUCTIONS \| PUBLIC GOODS \| INFORMATION

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Series:	G.R.E.Q.A.M..
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	16 pages
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779668