Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Two-sided Matching

This paper analyses a sufficient condition for uniqueness of equilibrium in two-sided matching with non-transferable utility. The condition is easy to interpret, being based on the notion that a person’s characteristics both form the basis of their attraction to the opposite sex, and determine their own sexual preferences.

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Year of publication:	2004-03
Authors:	Clark, Simon
Institutions:	School of Economics, University of Edinburgh
Subject:	Uniqueness \| matching \| marriage

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	ESE Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	1 pages long
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005147115