Uniqueness of Equilibrium Payoffs in the Stochastic Model of Bargaining

I provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in a model of stochastic bargaining with unanimity rule and risk-averse players. My Condition (S) implies Condition (C) of Merlo and Wilson (1995) and is easy to verify in applications

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Evdokimov, Kirill S.
Publisher:	[2019]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory \| Verhandlungen \| Negotiations \| Stochastisches Spiel \| Stochastic game

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (12 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 15, 2019 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3491443 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012858936