Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chandrasekher, Madhav |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - New York, NY : Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2398911-7. - Vol. 10.2015, 1, p. 11-49
|
Subject: | Repeated games | collusion | communication | statistical testing | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition |
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