Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm

We examine all dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm. Under substitutable and quota-filling choice functions, we show how untruthful dominant strategies look like. Our finding leads to the uniqueness of equilibrium outcome despite the possibility of multiple equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Kumano, Taro ; Watabe, Masahiro
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 112.2011, 2, p. 135-137
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Deferred acceptance algorithm Multiple equilibria Dominant strategy implementation

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009146147