Use of competitive endogenous audit mechanisms by federal and state inspectors within environmental protection agencies
Dietrich Earnhart, Lana Friesen
| Year of publication: |
2021
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Earnhart, Dietrich ; Friesen, Lana |
| Published in: |
Journal of environmental economics and management : JEEM ; the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0095-0696, ZDB-ID 188687-3. - Vol. 109.2021, p. 1-26
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| Subject: | Environment | Inspections | Regulation | Tournament | Wastewater | Umweltpolitik | Environmental policy | Regulierung | Theorie | Theory | Umweltschutz | Environmental protection | Föderalismus | Federalism | Wirtschaftsprüfung | Financial audit | Umweltbehörde | Environment agency | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102476 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013185861