Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis

This paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis. If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Albrecht, James ; van Ours, Jan C.
Publisher:	Bonn : Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Subject:	Personalbeschaffung \| Qualifikation \| Signalling \| Schätzung \| Niederlande \| Recruitment \| signaling

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Series:	IZA Discussion Papers ; 399
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	844742430 [GVK] hdl:10419/21259 [Handle]
Classification:	I20 - Education. General
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270572