Using Employer Hiring Behaviour to Test the Educational Signalling Hypothesis

This Paper presents a test of the educational signalling hypothesis. If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.

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Year of publication:	2001-09
Authors:	Albrecht, James ; Ours, Jan C van
Institutions:	C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Subject:	recruitment \| signalling

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CEPR Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2968
Classification:	I20 - Education. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791386