Vertrauen : Substitut oder Komplement zu formellen Institutionen?

In this paper, we discuss the heavily debated issue whether trust (formal institutions) can only serve as complement(s) or rather as substitute(s) of formal institutions (trust). We take trust as a specific, cooperative investment. The trustor is mainly interested in the reliability of the trustee. The value of a trust relationship amounts and equals to not less than the social surplus which it can generate. Without additional provisions such as trigger strategies, reputation effects etc., however, a trust relationship will not evolve in a one shot game. Not even incentive compatible contracts can solve the dilemma. In a perfect jurisdiction world, a social optimal solution is feasible in the case where both parties agree on liquidated damagesʺ. A comparable social surplus can also be achieved in a non-perfect jurisdiction world. A necessary condition is that the trustor is responsible for the larger part of the social surplus.