Vetoes Overridable by Simple Majorities

Conventional wisdom has it that the absolute (purely negative) veto is ineffective when overridable by a simple majority. That is flatly false. The examples that prove this surprising fact are themselves surprisingly ordinary yet oddly resistant to direct observation. They reveal virtues of a neglected institutional design. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Schwartz, Thomas
Published in:	Constitutional Political Economy. - Springer, ISSN 1043-4062. - Vol. 15.2004, 4, p. 383-389
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	voting \| veto \| simple majority

More details

Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005673722