Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information

The core is extended to games with incomplete information. The feasible set is characterized by incentive-compatible mechanisms, and blocking may similarly be organized by an incentive compatible mediation plan. Nonemptiness is proven for games with a balanced structure

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Year of publication:	2004-08-11
Authors:	Myerson, Roger
Institutions:	Econometric Society
Subject:	core \| incomplete information \| virtual utility

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Econometric Society North American Summer Meetings 2004 Number 659
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342211