"Voluntarily Separable Repeated Games with Social Norms"

We extend the voluntarily separable repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara, 2009) to continuous actions. We show that there is a (constrained) efficient bimorphic equilibrium which is robust under evolutionary pressure. It consists of a cooperative strategy and a myopic defection strategy so that our model provides a foundation to incomplete information models as well.

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Year of publication:	2010-02
Authors:	Fujiwara-Greve, Takako ; Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro ; Suzuki, Nobue
Institutions:	Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy (CIRJE), Faculty of Economics

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CIRJE F-Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number CIRJE-F-715 20 pages longages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008603173