Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games

We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Llerena, Francesc ; Rafels, Carles
Institutions:	Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona
Subject:	convex games \| cooperative games \| stable sets

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Series:	Working Papers in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series Documents de Treball Number 245 0 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008679065