von Stackelberg’s equilibria for Bertrand‐Edgeworth duopoly with buyouts

Solves von Stackelberg equilibria in a Bertrand‐Edgeworth duopoly game. Shows that, initially, the environment is characterized by efficient rationing and capacity constraints. Since interest lies in sustaining monopoly outcomes from non‐co‐operative behaviour, introduces the buyout option, where rivals can absorb one another’s output before any consumer. Reveals that the outcomes change drastically in that players together are able to reach the monopoly profits.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Van Cayseele, Patrick ; Furth, Dave
Published in:	Journal of Economic Studies. - MCB UP Ltd, ISSN 1758-7387, ZDB-ID 1480042-1. - Vol. 23.1996, 5/6, p. 96-109
Publisher:	MCB UP Ltd
Subject:	Management buy‐outs \| Economic theory \| Game theory \| Monopolies

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	conceptual-paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1108/01443589610154081 [DOI]
Source:	Other ZBW resources

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014863496