Voting by Committees under Constraints

We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.

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Year of publication:	2001-10-23
Authors:	Salvador BARBER? ; Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es ; NEME, Alejandro
Institutions:	Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Subject:	Voting \| Strategy-proofness \| Additive and Separable Preferences

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	Hungarian
Notes:	3 pages long
Classification:	D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572210