Voting in the bicameral Congress : large majorities as a signal of quality
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Iaryczower, Matiás ; Katz, Gabriel ; Saiegh, Sebastián M. |
Published in: |
The journal of law, economics, & organization. - Cary, NC [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 8756-6222, ZDB-ID 634985-7. - Vol. 29.2013, 5, p. 957-991
|
Subject: | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | Economic theory of democracy | Parlament | Parliament | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Politische Entscheidung | Political decision | Theorie | Theory | USA | United States |
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