Voting on prices vs. voting on quantities in a World Climate Assembly
Year of publication: |
June 2017
|
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Authors: | Weitzman, Martin L. |
Published in: |
Research in economics : an international review of economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, ISSN 1090-9443, ZDB-ID 1379004-3. - Vol. 71.2017, 2, p. 199-211
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Subject: | Climate change | Global warming | International public goods | Prices vs. quantities | Klimawandel | Theorie | Theory | Emissionshandel | Emissions trading | Klimaschutz | Climate protection | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Wohlfahrtsanalyse | Welfare analysis | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Quotenregulierung | Quantity regulation | Welt | World | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Preisregulierung | Price regulation | Ökosteuer | Environmental tax |
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