Vulcans and Klingons (part one): Simulating an Evolutionary Game with Random Matching and Adjustable Expectations.

The possibility of cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma without memory is investigated in an evolutionary framework where 1) some agents ('Vulcans') are morally commited to cooperation, 2) some others ('Klingons') are not commited at all, and 3) there is random matching.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Gaspart, F.
Institutions:	Faculté des Sciences Économiques, Sociales et de Gestion (FSESG), Université de Namur
Subject:	GAMES \| EXPECTATIONS \| MATHEMATICS

More details

Series:	Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	22 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C71 - Cooperative Games ; C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005625612