Wage differentiation via subsidised general training

V. Bhaskar; Steinar Holden

We provide a new explanation for why firms pay for general training in a competitive labor market. If firms are unable to tailor individual wages to ability, for informational or institutional reasons, they will pay for general training in order to attract better quality workers. The market provision of training may well exceed the first best level. Our explanation relies on wage compression within skill categories, while imperfect competition based explanations for firm subsidised general training rely on wage compression across skill categories.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Bhaskar, V. ; Holden, Steinar
Publisher:	Munich : Univ., Center for Economic Studies [u.a.]
Subject:	Berufsbildung \| Vocational training \| Betriebliches Bildungsmanagement \| Employer-provided training \| Lohnstruktur \| Wage structure \| Bildungsinvestition \| Human capital investment \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	24 S graph. Darst
Series:	CESifo working papers : the international platform of Ludwig-Maximilians University's Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute. - Munich : CESifo, ISSN 1617-9595, ZDB-ID 2023380-2. - Vol. 848
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Internetausg.: http://www.cesifo.de/pls/ifo_app/DocLinkCESifoDl?getDoc=cesifo_wp848.pdf Literaturverz. 22 - 24
Classification:	J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001731909