Wage differentiation via subsidised general training

We provide a new explanation for why firms pay for general training in a competitive labor market. If firms are unable to tailor individual wages to ability, for informational or institutional reasons, they will pay for general training in order to attract better quality workers. The market provision of training may well exceed the first best level. Our explanation relies on wage compression within skill categories, while imperfect competition based explanations for firm subsidised general training rely on wage compression across skill categories.

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Bhaskar, V. ; Holden, Steinar
Publisher:	Oslo : University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Subject:	Berufsbildung \| Betriebliches Bildungsmanagement \| Lohnstruktur \| Bildungsinvestition \| Theorie \| competitive labor market \| general training

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Series:	Memorandum ; 2002,35
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	359084257 [GVK] hdl:10419/63091 [Handle]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284377