Wage Transparency and Performance: A Real-Effort Experiment

Without transparency about peer wages in a real effort experiment, a change of wages does not affect performance. With transparency, however, higher paid workers tend to work more accurately, and lower paid workers shirk more under piece rates.

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Year of publication:	2010-03-01
Authors:	Greiner, Ben ; Ockenfels, Axel ; Werner, Peter
Institutions:	Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Subject:	labor market experiments \| real effort \| social comparison \| wage schemes

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Paper Series in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 48
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs)
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583499