Weakest Collective Rationality and the Nash Bargaining Solution

We propose a new axiom, Weakest Collective Rationality (WCR) which is weaker than both Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO) in Nash (1950)’s original characterization and Strong Individual Rationality (SIR) in Roth (1977)’s characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. We then characterize the Nash solution by Symmetry (SYM), Scale Invariance (SI), Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and our Weakest Collective Rationality (WCR) axiom.

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Year of publication:	2009-10-27
Authors:	Anbarci, Nejat ; Sun, Ching-jen
Institutions:	Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance
Subject:	Nash Bargaining Solution \| Pareto Optimality \| Strong Individual Rationality \| Weak Pareto Optimality \| Weakest Collective Rationality

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 2009_16
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008479704