Welfare Analysis of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates in the UK with an Application to the Orange/T-Mobile Merger
We present a calibrated model of the UK mobile telephony market with four mobile networks; calls to and from the fixed network; network-based price discrimination; and call externalities. Our results show that reducing mobile termination rates broadly in line with the recent European Commission Recommendation to either "pure long-run incremental cost"; reciprocal termination charges with fixed networks; or "Bill & Keep" (i.e. zero termination rates), increases social welfare, consumer surplus and networks' profits. Depending on the strength of call externalities, social welfare may increase by as much as £ 990 million to £ 4.5 billion per year, with Bill & Keep leading to the highest increase in welfare. We also apply the model to estimate the welfare effects of the 2010 merger between Orange and T-Mobile under different scenarios concerning MTRs, and predict that consumer surplus decreases strongly.
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Harbord, David ; Hoernig, Steffen |
Institutions: | Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa |
Subject: | telecommunications | regulation | mobile termination rates | network effects | welfare | calibration |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | 48 pages |
Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L51 - Economics of Regulation ; L96 - Telecommunications |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010600831