Welfare-improving effect of a small number of followers in a Stackelberg model
Year of publication: |
2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ino, Hiroaki ; Matsumura, Toshihiro |
Published in: |
The B.E. journal of theoretical economics. - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704, ZDB-ID 2268339-2. - Vol. 16.2016, 1, p. 243-265
|
Subject: | multiple leaders | Stackelberg | Cournot | limit result | convex cost | Duopol | Duopoly | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Oligopol | Oligopoly |
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