Welfare maximization in stable sharing services

Pietro Salmaso

We propose a model of sharing of public services among local governments. Our model is an application of Nicoló et al. (2023) and combines features of two models: assignment games (Shapley and Shubik, 1971) and the division problem (Sprumont, 1991). I show that the SAM algorithm provided in Nicoló et al. (2023) generates a stable allocation that maximizes utilitarian welfare when preferences are Euclidean single-peaked. We then discuss the incentive compatibility of the solution proposed and the relation with welfare functions different from the utilitarian one.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2024
Authors:	Salmaso, Pietro
Published in:	Socio-economic planning sciences : the international journal of public sector decision-making. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, ISSN 0038-0121, ZDB-ID 1491145-0. - Vol. 93.2024, Art.-No. 101844, p. 1-9
Subject:	Matching theory \| Rawlsian welfare \| Sharing services \| Utilitarian welfare \| Wohlfahrtsökonomik \| Welfare economics \| Interne Dienstleistung \| Internal services \| Utilitarismus \| Utilitarianism \| Wohlfahrtsanalyse \| Welfare analysis \| Rawls-Gerechtigkeitstheorie \| Rawls's theory of justice \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function \| Sozialstaat \| Welfare state

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1016/j.seps.2024.101844 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014548994