What's in a Lobbyist? A Case Study of the Lobbyists of the Canadian International Development Agency

Special interest groups spend large amounts of money lobbying governments in many advanceddemocracies. However, not much is known about whether some lobbyists more successfullycommunicate with policymakers. I investigate if some lobbyists are more successfulin contacting policymakers. I compare two lobbyist types: consultants hired by special interestgroups on a contract basis, and in-house lobbyists who are part of the special interests’payroll. I focus on lobbying activities that targeted the Canadian International DevelopmentAgency (CIDA). I exploit the availability of monthly reports on the arranged and oralcommunications between the lobbyists and federal officials. Using the universe of lobby registrationsthat targeted CIDA from 2008 to 2014, I find that in-house lobbyists are more likelyto contact federal and CIDA officials successfully. Further investigation reveals that in-houselobbyists are also more successful in contacting federal ministers and top politicians and bureaucratsin CIDA. I check if the results hold when using an instrumental variable approachbased on the special interest client’s previous use of consultant lobbyists. The results arerobust to the use of an alternative empirical strategy. The results point to the important rolemoral hazard plays in the lobbying process