When a precedent of donation favors defection in the prisoner's dilemma
| Year of publication: |
2011
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Garapin, Alexis ; Llerena, Daniel ; Hollard, Michel |
| Published in: |
German economic review. - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1465-6485, ZDB-ID 1481108-X. - Vol. 12.2011, 4, p. 409-421
|
| Subject: | Gefangenendilemma | Prisoner's dilemma | Kooperation | Cooperation | Fundraising | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Experiment |
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