When Competition Corrupts : A Theoretical Analysis of Market Structure and the Incidence of Corruption

Basu, Kaushik

The paper develops a simple model to demonstrate that, paradoxically, greater competition may exacerbate the problem of corruption. Market participants engaging in corrupt practices enjoy lower production costs-maybe because they pay a bribe to avoid installing the environmental safeguards required by law-such that honest players are driven out of the market when the market becomes sufficiently competitive

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Basu, Kaushik
Other Persons:	Zhang, Boyang (contributor) ; Basu, Kaushik (contributor) ; McGavock, Tamara (contributor)
Publisher:	Washington, D.C : The World Bank
Subject:	Korruption \| Corruption \| Marktstruktur \| Market structure \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	Online-Ressource (10 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1596/1813-9450-6596 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011395873