When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Doğan, Battal ; Yenmez, M. Bumin |
Published in: |
Economic theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-0479, ZDB-ID 1398355-6. - Vol. 76.2023, 4, p. 1145-1173
|
Subject: | Deferred acceptance algorithm | Market design | Multistage assignment | School choice |
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