When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Doğan, Battal ; Yenmez, M. Bumin |
Subject: | Deferred acceptance algorithm | Market design | Multistage assignment | School choice | Schulauswahl | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Matching | Algorithmus | Algorithm |
-
Single versus multiple randomization in matching mechanisms
Schmelzer, André, (2016)
-
Single versus multiple randomization in matching mechanisms
Schmelzer, André, (2017)
-
Outcome equivalence in school choice with reciprocal preferences
Haake, Claus-Jochen, (2018)
- More ...
-
Unified Enrollment in School Choice : How to Improve Student Assignment in Chicago
Doğan, Battal, (2017)
-
Unified Versus Divided Enrollment in School Choice : Improving Student Welfare in Chicago
Doğan, Battal, (2018)
-
Consistent Pareto Improvement Over the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism
Doğan, Battal, (2019)
- More ...