When does single‐source versus multiple‐source lending matter?

Purpose – Seek to compare the consequences of single‐source versus multiple‐source lending for a borrower who has loans that can be prematurely terminated. Design/methodology/approach – The considered model framework is an option‐theoretic firm value model similar to Merton (1974) but where lenders have the additional right to prematurely terminate the loans. The single lender is a monopolist, while multiple lenders are represented by a continuum without individual impact on the aggregate termination decision. Findings – The model e x plains that, if the borrower is in financial distress but has positive net present value projects, a single lender has a higher incentive to save the firm and therefore terminates fewer loans than multiple lenders. In the opposite case where the firm is not under financial distress, it is the other way round and multiple lenders terminate fewer loans than a single lender. As a result, equity holders are better off by having a loan from a single‐source under financial distress but multiple‐source lending is advantageous in the absence of financial distress. Research limitations/implications – To focus on the origin for arising differences from single‐source and multiple‐source lending, consideration is given to the simple case with perfect information and without monitoring and renegotiation. These market imperfections can be incorporated into the model in a straightforward way. Originality/value – While other models in the literature require market imperfections to e x plain the relevance of the bank relationship, this paper indicates that even in the absence of market imperfections the lending relationship is fundamental as long as lenders have the right for early terminations.