When Inertia Generates Political Cycles

We propose a simple infinite horizon of repeated elections with two candidates. Furthermore we suppose that the government policy presents some degree of inertia, i.e. a new government cannot completely change the policy implemented by the incumbent. When the policy inertia is strong enough, no party can win the election a consecutive infinite number of times.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Soubeyran, Raphäel
Publisher:	Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Subject:	Politischer Konjunkturzyklus \| Wahl \| Theorie \| Political Cycles \| Inertia

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Series:	Nota di Lavoro ; 91.2006
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	516918974 [GVK] hdl:10419/74018 [Handle] RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.91 [RePEc]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; H7 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312370