When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?

We study the relationship between a player's (stage game) minmax payoff and the individually rational payoff in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. We characterize the signal structures under which these two payoffs coincide for any payoff matrix. Under a full rank assumption, we further show that, if the monitoring structure of an infinitely repeated game 'nearly' satisfies this condition, then these two payoffs are approximately equal, independently of the discount factor. This provides conditions under which existing folk theorems exactly characterize the limiting payoff set.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Gossner, Olivier ; Hörner, Johannes
Publisher:	Evanston : Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Subject:	Wiederholte Spiele \| Signalling \| Theorie

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Series:	Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science ; 1440
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	587537507 [GVK] hdl:10419/31211 [Handle]
Source:	EconStor