When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?
Year of publication: |
2006
|
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Authors: | Gossner, Olivier ; Hörner, Johannes |
Publisher: |
Evanston : Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |
Subject: | Wiederholte Spiele | Signalling | Theorie |
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