When liability is not enough : regulating bonus payments in markets with advice
Jun Honda, Roman Inderst, Marco Ottaviani
| Year of publication: |
2024
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| Authors: | Honda, Jun ; Inderst, Roman ; Ottaviani, Marco |
| Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Hanover, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5501, ZDB-ID 2023019-9. - Vol. 70.2024, 2, p. 1301-1314
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| Subject: | biased recommendations | liability | markets with advice | nonlinear incentives and bonus payments | regulation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Theorie | Theory | Regulierung | Regulation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Anreiz | Incentives | Haftung | Liability |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1287/mnsc.2023.4750 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014513926