When managers cannot commit: Capital structure under inalienable managerial entrenchment

When partially inalienable managerial entrenchment is introduced to Zwiebel's 1996 model of dynamic capital structure, anticipated debt renegotiation between a higher-type manager and the creditor reduces expected firm value. Only lower-type managers can issue debt to avoid shareholder takeover.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Thomas, Catherine ; Wang, Yongxiang
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 110.2011, 2, p. 107-109
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Managerial entrenchment Commitment Debt Bankruptcy

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008866988