When negotiators with honest reputations are less (and more) likely to be deceived
Ilanit SimanTov-Nachlieli, Liron Har-Vardi, Simone Moran
| Year of publication: |
2020
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|---|---|
| Authors: | SimanTov-Nachlieli, Ilanit ; Har-Vardi, Liron ; Moran, Simone |
| Published in: |
Organizational behavior and human decision processes : a journal of fundamental research and theory in applied psychology. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0749-5978, ZDB-ID 629198-3. - Vol. 157.2020, p. 68-84
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| Subject: | Anticipated guilt | Anticipated reciprocity | Deception | Honest negotiator reputation | Integrity | Reputation | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Firmenimage | Corporate reputation | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.obhdp.2019.11.006 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012253959