When salespeople manage customer relationships : multidimensional incentives and private information
Minkyung Kim, K. Sudhir, Kosuke Uetake, and Rodrigo Canales
| Year of publication: |
2019
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Kim, Minkyung ; Sudhir, K. ; Uetake, Kosuke ; Canales, Rodrigo |
| Published in: |
Journal of marketing research. - Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publishing, ISSN 1547-7193, ZDB-ID 2066604-4. - Vol. 56.2019, 5, p. 749-766
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| Subject: | sales force compensation | customer relationship management | private information | adverse selection | moral hazard | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Beziehungsmarketing | Relationship marketing | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Verkaufspersonal | Salespeople | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1177/0022243719847661 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012177637