When ties are possible : weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Diss, Mostapha ; Dougherty, Keith L. ; Heckelman, Jac C. |
Published in: |
Mathematical social sciences. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : NH, Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896, ZDB-ID 283230-6. - Vol. 123.2023, p. 128-136
|
Subject: | Weak Condorcet winner | Transitivity | Ehrhart polynomials | Probability | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Theorie | Theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
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