When too little is as good as nothing at all: Rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds

We study the problem of rationing a divisible good among a group of people. Each personʼs preferences are characterized by an ideal amount that he would prefer to receive and a minimum quantity that he will accept: any amount less than this threshold is just as good as receiving nothing at all. Any amount beyond his ideal quantity has no effect on his welfare.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Manjunath, Vikram
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 74.2012, 2, p. 576-587
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Pareto-efficiency \| Strategy-proofness \| Fairness \| Rationing \| Lower-bounds \| Sequential priority rules

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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