Who benefits from a sender's credibility concern, the sender or a receiver?

In an information transmission situation, a sender's concern for its credibility could endow itself with an invisible power to control a receiver's decision so that the sender can manipulate information without being detected. The current paper models this paradoxical role of the sender's credibility concern.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Jung, Hanjoon Michael
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 105.2009, 3, p. 204-207
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Anti-coordination game Credibility Information transmission Hawk-Dove game Paradox

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008474005