Who benefits from covert evidence acquisition in principal-agent interactions?
Kym Pram
| Year of publication: |
2024
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Pram, Kym |
| Subject: | Contract theory | Hard evidence | Information acquisition | Mechanism design | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Übernahme | Takeover | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information |
freely available
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111675 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015074439