Who goes first? Strategic delay and learning by waiting

This paper considers a "war of attrition" game in which agents learn about an uncertain state of the world through private signals and from their peers. I provide existence and uniqueness results for a class of equilibria that satisfy a "full-participation" condition, and show that asymmetries in the distribution of information can lead to excessive stopping and an oversupply of information relative to the social optimum.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Wagner, Peter
Publisher:	München : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Series:	SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 500
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.5282/ubm/epub.24764 [DOI] 826774172 [GVK] hdl:10419/121384 [Handle]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350848