Why and when do family firms invest less in talent management? : the suppressor effect of risk aversion
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Basco, Rodrigo ; Bassetti, Thomas ; Dal Maso, Lorenzo ; Lattanzi, Nicola |
Published in: |
Journal of management & governance. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, ISSN 1572-963X, ZDB-ID 2016991-7. - Vol. 27.2023, 1, p. 101-130
|
Subject: | Adverse selection | Family ownership | Industry competition | Moral hazard | Risk aversion | Talent management | Familienunternehmen | Family business | Risikoaversion | Hochqualifizierte Arbeitskräfte | Highly skilled workers | Adverse Selektion | Moral Hazard | Theorie | Theory | Risiko | Risk | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Personalmanagement | Human Resource Management | Risikomanagement | Risk management |
-
The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent
Maréchal, François, (2018)
-
Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment
Karajvanov, Alexander K., (2018)
-
Mitigating agency risk between investors and ventures' managers
Bellavitis, Cristiano, (2017)
- More ...
-
Family ownership and environmental performance : The mediation effect of human resource practices
Dal Maso, Lorenzo, (2020)
-
Family businesses in Eastern European countries : how informal payments affect exports
Bassetti, Thomas, (2015)
-
Going green : environmental risk management, market value and performance
Dal Maso, Lorenzo, (2024)
- More ...