Why are corrupt countries less successful in consolidating their budgets?
| Year of publication: |
2011
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Arin, Kerim Peren ; Chmelarova, Viera ; Feess, Eberhard ; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar |
| Published in: |
Journal of public economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0047-2727, ZDB-ID 183995-0. - Vol. 95.2011, 7/8, p. 521-530
|
| Subject: | Korruption | Corruption | Haushaltskonsolidierung | Fiscal consolidation | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | OECD-Staaten | OECD countries | 1978-2007 |
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