Why disclose less information? : toward resolving a disclosure puzzle in the housing market
Year of publication: |
2023
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Authors: | Bian, Xun ; Contat, Justin C. ; Waller, Bennie D. ; Wentland, Scott A. |
Published in: |
The journal of real estate finance and economics. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1573-045X, ZDB-ID 2018867-5. - Vol. 66.2023, 2, p. 443-486
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Subject: | Agency cost | Agent | Asymmetric information | Brokerage | Information disclosure | Photos | Principal-agent | Probability of sale | Residential real estate | Sale price | Time-on-market | Theorie | Theory | Asymmetrische Information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Wohnimmobilien | Immobilienpreis | Real estate price | Immobilienmakler | Real estate brokers | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Immobilienmarkt | Real estate market | Wohnungsmarkt | Housing market |
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