Why Do Biased Heuristics Approximate Bayes Rule in Double Auctions?

Jamal and Sunder (1996) showed that the median prices in double auctions populated by zero-intelligence (ZI) traders whose trading limits are set by two biased heuristics tend to converge to the same equilibrium as if their trading limits were set by applying Bayes' Rule. This note provides an analytical explanation of why the repeated use of biased heuristics approximates Bayes rule

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Year of publication:	[2015]
Authors:	Jamal, Karim
Other Persons:	Sunder, Shyam (contributor)
Publisher:	[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (8 p)
Series:	Yale SOM Working Paper ; No. ES-12
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 1, 2000 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.272450 [DOI]
Classification:	A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines ; C11 - Bayesian Analysis ; D44 - Auctions ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012708283