Why do CEOs agree to the discipline of dividends?
Year of publication: |
July 2017
|
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Authors: | Drummond Smith, Deborah ; Pennathur, Anita K. ; Marciniak, Marek R. |
Published in: |
International review of financial analysis. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1057-5219, ZDB-ID 1133622-5. - Vol. 52.2017, p. 38-48
|
Subject: | Dividend policy | Corporate governance | Dividend initiation | CEO power | Agency theory | Free cash flow hypothesis | Outcome model | Substitute model | Dual CEOs | Institutional ownership | Board independence | Shareholders' rights | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Dividende | Dividend | Corporate Governance | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Cash Flow | Cash flow | Vorstand | Executive board | Ausschüttungspolitik | Payout policy | Investitionsentscheidung | Investment decision | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Aktionäre | Shareholders |
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