Why do firms utilize the flexibility allowed in CEO-employee pay ratio disclosure? : evidence from Dodd-Frank Act Section 953 (b)
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Jung, Sun-Moon ; Kim, Natalie Kyung Won ; Ryu, Han Seong ; Shin, Jae Yong |
Published in: |
Accounting horizons : a quarterly publication of the American Accounting Association. - Sarasota, Fla. : American Accounting Association, ISSN 0888-7993, ZDB-ID 638756-1. - Vol. 35.2021, 2, p. 83-106
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Subject: | CEo-employee pay ratio | pay ratio disclosure | permitted discretions | required pay ratio | supplement pay ratio | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Lohnstruktur | Wage structure | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Großbritannien | United Kingdom |
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